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Resumo		A	 chamada	 “virada	da	 vulnerabilidade”	 envolvia	 principalmente	 ética.	 Essa	linha	 de	 pensamento	 encontrou	 análises	 feministas,	 especialmente	 aquelas	que	desenvolviam	uma	 “ética	do	cuidado”.	Nas	páginas	 seguintes,	descrevo	os	 principais	 estágios	 da	 reflexão	 filosófica	 contemporânea	 sobre	vulnerabilidade,	 enfocando	 as	 relações	 entre	 a	 teoria	 da	 vulnerabilidade	 e	algumas	 versões	 da	 ética	 do	 cuidado.	 Tento,	 então,	mostrar	 como	 as	 teses	sobre	vulnerabilidade	 (e	 cuidados),	hoje	mantidas	predominantemente	por	estudiosos	da	América	do	Norte,	podem	ser	empregadas	na	Europa	à	luz	da	evolução	do	"Estado	constitucional".	
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Abstract	
The	 so	 called	 “vulnerability	 turn”	 mainly	 involved	 ethics.	 This	 line	 of	
thought	 encountered	 feminist	 analyses,	 especially	 those	 developing	 an	
“ethics	 of	 care”.	 In	 the	 following	 pages	 I	 outline	 the	 main	 stages	 of	
contemporary	 philosophical	 reflection	 on	 vulnerability,	 focusing	 on	 the	
relationships	 between	 vulnerability	 theory	 and	 some	 versions	 of	 the	
ethics	of	care.	I	then	try	to	show	how	the	theses	about	vulnerability	(and	
care),	 today	 held	 predominantly	 by	 North	 American	 scholars,	 can	 be	
employed	in	Europe	in	light	of	the	evolution	of	the	“constitutional	state”.	
Keywords:	Vulnerability,	 Care,	 Equality,	 Feminist	 theory,	 Constitutional	
State.	
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Introduction:	Vulnerability	and	Care		
In	 contemporary	 times,	 thinking	 about	 vulnerability	 has	 developed	 mainly	 in	 the	 field	 of	
ethics.	Feminist	analyses	have	contributed	to	this	development,	in	particular	theses	formulated	by	
authors	 who	 theorized	 an	 "ethics	 of	 care".	 In	 the	 following	 pages	 I	 briefly	 review	 some	 of	 the	
stages	of	contemporary	philosophical	thinking	about	vulnerability,	focusing	specifically	on	the	links	
between	this	and	some	versions	of	the	ethics	of	care.	 I	then	proffer	some	insights	for	evaluating	
how	 the	 outcome	 of	 thinking	 about	 vulnerability	 (and	 care),	 currently	 mainly	 addressed	 in	 US	
scholarship,	can	be	used	in	continental	Europe	in	light	of	the	evolution	of	the	constitutional	state.		
Contemporary	thinking	on	vulnerability	draws	on	the	work	of	a	number	of	twentieth-century	
philosophers	 such	 as	 Simone	Weil,	 Hannah	 Arendt,	 Emmanuel	 Lévinas	 and	 Paul	 Ricoeur,2	 who	
focused	mainly	on	“ontological	vulnerability”,	understood	as	a	universal	condition	that	unites	all	
human	beings	by	virtue	of	their	being	“susceptible	to	injury”.	(See	Cavarero,	2013)	This	condition	
of	exposure	is	due	both	to	the	fragility	of	human	nature	and	to	the	fact	that	we	relate	to	others.	
According	 to	 this	perspective,	 analysing	 vulnerability	 also	 involves	 thinking	about	 social	 ties	 and	
violence.	
Beginning	 in	the	2000s,	 Judith	Butler	and,	 in	 Italy,	Adriana	Cavarero,	grew	and	expanded	on	
this	 line	 of	 thought.	 Butler	 in	 particular	 took	 the	 pioneering	 step	 of	 combining	 an	 analysis	 of	
universal	ontological	vulnerability,	linked	to	our	being	“body”	-	which	Butler	calls	“precariousness”	
-	 with	 an	 emphasis	 on	 particular,	 socially	 produced	 vulnerabilities	 -	 what	 the	 author	 calls	
“precarity”.3	While	Butler	stresses	the	idea	of	exposure	to	the	other	(not	only	and	perhaps	not	so	
much	in	the	physical	sense,	but	in	the	sense	that	from	birth	we	are	“impinged	upon”,	marked	by	
relationships),	 Cavarero	 underlines	 the	 fact	 that,	 historically,	 interpersonal	 relationships	 have	
intentionally	 been	 represented	 as	 necessarily	 conflictual	 and	 violent,	wherein	 being	 exposed	 to	
injury	and	being	 rendered	helpless,	often	makes	us	 the	 recipients	not	of	others’	 violence	but	of	
their	care.4	Butler	and	Cavarero,	therefore,	both	set	off	from	ethics	to	imagine	a	politics	in	which	
violence	might	be	shifted	from	centre	stage	to	the	margins.5	For	Butler	(2009	and	2015),	however,	
not	only	is	thinking	on	ontological	vulnerability	combined	with	an	analysis	of	socially	produced	and	
unequally	 distributed	 vulnerability,	 but	 ontological	 vulnerability	 is	 necessarily	 experienced	 by	
individuals	 in	 socially	 and	 economically	 differentially	 distributed	 forms.6	 The	 vulnerability	 we	
experience	thus	depends	on	the	webs	of	protection	that	we	can	or	cannot	use.	Our	experience	of	
vulnerability	is	connected	to	the	power	relations	that	exist	in	a	society.		
As	Butler	points	out,	neoliberalism	places	us	in	a	paradoxical	position.	Its	ethical	imperative	is,	
indeed,	 individual	 responsibility:	 the	neoliberal	 subject	 is	 the	“entrepreneur	of	 themselves”.	The	
precarity	 generated	 by	 the	 market	 and	 progressive	 divestiture	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 makes	 it	
impossible	 for	most	people	 to	 invert	 this	ethical-social	model,	however.(Butler,	 2015)	 In	 today's	
“performance	society”	(Chicchi	and	Simone,	2017),	the	individual	is	thus	deprived	of	social	bonds,	
increasingly	exposed	to	precarity	by	the	disappearance	of	state	(and	social)	systems	of	protection,	
caught	up	in	biopolitical	mechanisms	aimed	at	dismantling	subjectivity:	the	body,	personality,	and	
																																								 																				2Some	scholars	have	referred	to	a	Jewish	thread	of	thinking	on	vulnerability	(see	for	example	Rossetti,	2018,	p.	83-108),	although	perhaps	 it	 would	 be	 more	 appropriate	 to	 call	 it	 Jewish-Christian.	 On	 the	 notion	 of	 vulnerability	 in	 Lévinas’s	 thought	 see	Ciaramelli,	2018.	3	See	Butler,	2004	and	Cavarero,	2007.	For	a	comparison	of	the	two	philosophers,	see	Bernini	and	Guaraldo,	2009.	4	Regarding	this	issue,	see	for	instance	Pinto,	2018,	p.	49-82.	5	Guaraldo,	2012	moves	in	the	same	direction.	6	On	this	topic,	see	the	analysis	by	Casalini,	2018,	p.	27-48.	
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social	 relations	are	“turned	 into	value”	or	“discarded”.	 (See	Bauman,	2004)	 In	 light	of	 this	point,	
vulnerability,	care,	and	protection	are	all	connected	and	raise	the	question	of	the	role	of	the	state.	
A	 theory	of	 ethics	 focused	on	 identifying	particular	 forms	of	 vulnerability	 had	 already	been	
developed	 during	 the	 1980s,	 previous	 to	 Butler’s	 and	 Cavarero’s	 analyses.	 Such	 theory	 draws	
ethical-normative	guidelines	from	the	“vulnerability	principle”.	It	was	mainly	Robert	Goodin	(1985)	
who	 argued,	 in	 Protecting	 the	 Vulnerable:	 	 A	 Reanalysis	 of	 our	 Social	 Responsibilities,	 that	 the	
majority	 of	 our	moral	 responsibilities	 (“special	 responsibilities”)	 derive	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 some	
subjects	are	in	a	position	of	dependence	in	relation	to	us,	that	is,	they	depend	on	our	actions	and	
choices.	 This	 fact	 gives	 rise	 to	 family	 and	 emotional	 responsibilities,	 for	 example,	 but	 also	 a	
number	of	responsibilities	towards	other	social	actors	and	the	community	in	general.	According	to	
this	 perspective,	 vulnerability	 is	 thus	 the	 primary	 source	 of	moral	 obligations	 and	 derives	 from	
relationships	which,	in	many	cases,	the	subjects	involved	do	not	“choose”.		
For	Goodin,	vulnerability	 is	a	relational	concept:	we	are	vulnerable	to	other	people’s	actions	
and	choices.	This	idea	of	ethics,	rooted	in	vulnerability,	closely	references	the	feminist	theories	of	
contemporary	ethics	of	care	from	the	same	period,	in	particular	theses	by	Virginia	Held	(1987,	p.	
111-137).	 This	 strand	 of	 feminist	 critique	 addresses	 contractualism	 –	 and	 even	 more	 so,	 neo-
contractualism	–	with	the	aim	of	bringing	to	light	the	bonds	of	dependence	that	the	paradigm	of	
democratic	citizenship	tends	to	conceal.	(See	also	Pateman,	1988)		
In	 the	 1990s,	 another	 feminist	 philosopher,	 Eva	 Feder	 Kittay,	 expanded	 on	 the	 analysis	 of	
dependency	relationships	and	their	implications.	In	both	Love's	Labor	(Kittay,	1999)	and	the	essay	
Dependency	(Kittay,	2015),	the	author	argues	that	the	liberal	conception	of	equality	as	theorized	
by	 Rawls	 is	 false	 because	 it	 conceals	 the	 fact	 that	 many	 people	 in	 society	 exist	 in	 a	 state	 of	
dependence.	There	is,	in	fact,	an	“inevitable	dependence”	uniting	everyone	at	different	stages	of	
life	 (childhood,	 old	 age,	 illness),	 and	 there	 are	 particular	 situations	 of	 dependence,	 such	 as	 the	
relationship	between	disabled	people	and	their	care	givers.	Traditionally,	adult	(white)	males	have	
been	represented	as	“independent”	because	the	task	of	caring	for		"dependents"	was	confined	to	
the	private	sphere	and	assigned	to	women.	
Kittay's	work	combines	disability	studies	and	feminist	disability	studies7	to	show	that	care	and	
dependence	 are	 a	 public	 problem.	 For	 Kittay,	 institutions	 should	 consider	 the	 management	 of	
dependency	a	priority	objective.	From	this	perspective,	both	universal	vulnerability	and	particular	
vulnerabilities	must	be	addressed	not	as	a	source	of	insecurity,	but	as	a	permanent	feature	of	any	
human	society.	It	is	therefore	not	a	question	of	paternalistically	protecting	vulnerable	individuals,	
but	rather	of	ensuring	social	justice.	8	
Kittay's	analysis	of	dependence	was	then	expanded	and	developed	by	Martha	Fineman.	In	the	
work	of	Kittay,	and	even	more	so	Fineman,	thinking	on	vulnerability	shifts	away	from	the	field	of	
ethics	 to	 extend	 into	 political	 philosophy	 and	 the	philosophy	of	 law.	According	 to	 Fineman,	 not	
only	 is	 protection	 from	 various	 forms	 of	 vulnerability	 –	 both	 universal	 and	 particular	 –	 a	 public	
issue,	but	the	state	exists	precisely	to	respond	to	the	vulnerability	of	its	citizens.	The	"paradigm	of	
vulnerability"	proposed	by	Fineman	thus	aims	to	redesign	institutional	action.		
Two	essays	Fineman	wrote	on	this	subject	had	a	particular	impact	on	the	debate	over	the	idea	
of	the	state	taking	responsibility	for	dealing	with	vulnerability:		The	Vulnerable	Subject:	anchoring	
equality	 in	the	human	condition	 (Fineman,	2008)	and	The	Vulnerable	Subject	and	the	Responsive	
State	 (Fineman,	 2010),	 which	 develops	 the	 theses	 presented	 in	 the	 previous	 essay.	 In	 The	
																																								 																				7	On	this	topic,	see	Bernardini,	2016.	8	On	this	topic	see	also	Dodds,	2007,	p.	500-510.	
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Vulnerable	 Subject,	 Fineman	 (2008,	 p.	 20)	 argues	 that	 the	 reference	 to	 universal	 ontological	
vulnerability	may	 help	 us	 to	 overcome	 the	 narrow	 boundaries	 of	 anti-discrimination	 law	 in	 the	
direction	of	a	more	substantive	conception	of	equality.	Redefining	a	subject	beginning	from	their	
ontological	 vulnerability	 (vulnerable	 subject	 vs.	 the	 autonomous	 and	 independent	 subject	 of	 a	
certain	 liberal	 tradition)	 enables	 us	 to	 “expand	 current	 ideas	 about	 state	 responsibility	 toward	
individuals	and	institutions”.	It	also	makes	it	possible	to	expose	the	deception	behind	the	myth	of	
autonomy	 inherent	 in	mainstream	US	 liberalism,	 i.e.	 the	 concealment	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 “societal	
institutions	play	a	significant	role	in	maintaining	and	extending	inequality”.	(Fineman,	2008,	p.	2)	
The	vulnerability	approach	thus	appears	to	be	a	post-identity	approach	which	moves	beyond	
the	theory	of	intersectionality:	“it	is	not	multiple	identities”	–	Fineman	(2008,	p.	16)	writes	–	“that	
intersect	 to	produce	compounded	 inequalities	…	but	 rather	 systems	of	power	and	privilege	 that	
interact	to	produce	webs	of	advantages	and	disadvantages”.	Both	identities	and	inequalities	are,	
in	 fact,	 first	 and	 foremost	 a	 product	 of	 institutional	 practices.	 Based	 on	 these	 premises,	 the	
vulnerability	approach	allows	Fineman	to	build	broad	coalitions	to	oppose	social	inequalities.		
The	author	seems	to	draw	closer	to	Nancy	Fraser	 (Fraser	und	Honneth,	2003)	 in	some	ways	
when	 she	 argues	 that	 mere	 recognition	 is	 insufficient	 and	 that	 there	 is	 a	 need	 to	 distribute	
resources	 more	 effectively.	 While	 Fraser's	 lexicon	 is	 more	 European,	 however,	 referencing	 the	
notions	 of	 “social	 justice”	 and	 redistribution	 of	 material	 resources	 rather	 than	 forms	 of	
recognition,	Fineman's	 lexicon	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	political	 theory	and	 law	of	 the	United	States.	She	
describes	resources	as	"assets"	through	which	the	state	confers	privileges	on	some	and	allocates	
disadvantages	to	others.	The	vulnerability	approach	is	aimed	at	unveiling	this	dynamic	–	one	that	
cannot	be	identified	using	the	perspective	of	formal	equality	–	in	order	to	demand	that	the	state	
use	 substantive	 equality	 as	 the	 guiding	 light	 for	 its	 action	 and	 play	 an	 active	 role	 in	 combating	
social	 inequalities,	 both	 through	 public	 institutions	 (taxation	 policies,	 welfare,	 etc.)	 and	 by	
overseeing	 the	 operation	 of	 institutions	 which	 are	 considered	 private	 (family,	 corporations,	
associations,	 etc.).	 Through	 vulnerability	 theory,	 therefore,	 Fineman	 calls	 for	 a	 return	 to	 the	
regulatory	authority	of	the	state	to	favour	substantive	equality	and	insists	that	 legislation	should	
prevail	over	jurisdictional	law.		
In	 The	 Vulnerable	 Subject	 and	 the	 Responsive	 State,	 the	 author	 underlines	 the	 tension	 –	
typical	of	the	US	system	like	any	liberal-democracy	–	between	autonomy	and	equality;	in	so	doing,	
however,	she	argues	that	“we	must	reverse	the	positioning	of	equality	as	the	dependent	value	in	
American	politics,	one	that	is	shaped	through	the	dominant	lens	of	autonomy”.	(Fineman,	2010,	p.	
20)		
The	 target	of	 Fineman's	 critique	 is	a	 “libertarian”	 conception	of	autonomy.	The	philosopher	
argues	 against	 theories	 of	minimum	 state	 responsibility,	 but	 also	 against	 a	mainstream	 culture	
that	guides	 the	American	 legal	 system	and	 is	 inspired	by	a	 radical	 interpretation	of	 liberalism.	A	
critique	 of	 the	 “myth	 of	 autonomy”	 was,	 after	 all,	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 her	 work	 prior	 to	 the	
“vulnerability	 turn”	 -	 The	 Autonomy	Myth.	 A	 Theory	 of	 Dependency	 -	 in	 which	 Fineman	 (2004)	
denounced	 the	 role	 that	 the	myth	of	autonomy	plays	 in	American	political	 rhetoric	and	popular	
discourse.	It	is	a	myth	that	interprets	autonomy	in	very	narrow	terms,	linking	it	to	economic	self-
sufficiency	and	“a	sense	of	separation	from	others	in	society”.	(Fineman,	2004,	p.	XVI)	Autonomy,	
understood	in	this	way,	is	opposed	to	vulnerability.	The	state	must	become	“responsible”	towards	
all	forms	(both	ontological	and	socially	produced)	of	vulnerability.		
The	 aim	 of	 Fineman,	 like	 Kittay	 and	 Joan	 Tronto,	 another	 important	 theorist	 of	 “ethics	 of	
care”,	 is	to	politicise	care,	to	show	that	 it	 is	not	a	“private	matter”.	Such	politicization	 is	key	not	
only	because,	if	left	to	the	private	sector,	care	weighs	mainly	on	the	shoulders	of	certain	subjects	–	
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and	 in	 particular	women,	who	have	historically	 been	 entrusted	with	 caretaking	 tasks	 –	 but	 also	
because	 care	 (the	work	 of	 “reproduction”	 in	 the	 lexicon	 of	Marxist	 feminist	 economists)	 is	 the	
cornerstone	on	which	all	of	society	is	built.	
Fineman	and	Kittay	emphasize	the	need	to	reformulate	the	action	of	the	state	in	line	with	the	
needs	 of	 citizens,	 moving	 the	 promotion	 of	 individual	 autonomy	 into	 the	 background.	 	 Joan	
Tronto,	on	the	other	hand,	first	in	Moral	Boundaries	(1993)	and	later	in	Caring	Democracy	(2013),	
positions	 the	 theme	 of	 care	 within	 a	 clearly	 liberal-democratic	 framework.	 In	 responding	 to	
people's	needs	–	in	taking	responsibility	for	people's	vulnerability,	to	use	Fineman's	vocabulary	–	
the	 state	 must	 not	 adopt	 a	 charitable,	 welfare	 or	 paternalistic	 approach.	 On	 the	 contrary,	
institutional	 action	 must	 be	 organized	 by	 involving	 the	 recipients	 of	 care	 in	 planning	 and	
implementing	policies.	In	other	words,	according	to	Tronto	(1993)	practices	of	care	are	practices	of	
democracy	that	must	strengthen	the	agency	of	the	subjects.	As	she	argues,	thinking	of	people	as	
interdependent	allows	us	to	understand	both	the	elements	of	human	life	depending	on	autonomy	
and	 those	 depending	 on	 the	 relationships	 in	 which	 we	 are	 involved.	 The	 value	 of	 care	 is	 not	
opposed	 to	 liberal	values,	 therefore;	 rather,	 it	 integrates	 them	or,	we	might	also	say,	 it	 corrects	
them.	 Care	 also	 makes	 it	 possible	 to	 denounce	 social	 injustices	 by	 bringing	 to	 light	 power	
relationships	that	have	long	remained	invisible.	Care,	vulnerability	and	social	justice	are	therefore	
linked.		
Tronto	clearly	identifies	the	risk	of	paternalism	(or	maternalism)	involved	in	the	enhancement	
of	 care	 as	 a	 political	 ideal9	 and	 also	 points	 out	 the	 risk	 of	 particularism:	 anyone,	 committed	 to	
valuing	 the	 care	 relationships	 in	 which	 they	 are	 immersed,	 can	 lose	 sight	 of	 the	 wider	 social	
framework	(they	can	close	themselves	off,	as	Tocqueville	had	already	warned	us,	 in	the	circle	of	
small	 domestic	 interests).	 However,	 care	 can	 also	 strengthen	 democratic	 participation.	 In	 fact,	
Tronto	describes	democracy	as	“caring	with".	Democracy	can	be	 redefined	beginning	 from	care.	
This	does	not	imply	an	irenic	vision	of	care:	care	is	the	object	of	conflict,	concerning	the	unequal	
distribution	of	care	responsibilities	at	the	social	level.	It	also	leads	to	the	establishment	of	power	
relationships	 (first	 and	 foremost,	 between	 care	 givers	 and	 receivers)	 and	 is	 also	 guided	 by	
interests.	Tronto’s	objective	is	thus	to	bring	to	light	the	injustices	linked	to	the	distribution	of	care	
tasks	and	to	work	towards	a	shift	that	simultaneously	democratises	care	and	redirects	social	and	
institutional	 democratic	 action	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 valorizing	 (and	 redistributing)	 care-taking	 tasks.	
Care	is	a	state’s	duty;	it	does	not	spring	naturally	from	human	feelings	and	behaviours.	Rather,	it	
must	be	shaped	and	enhanced.		
The	Role	of	the	State		
Tronto,	 Kittay	 and	 Fineman	 raise	 the	 question	 of	 state	 responsibility	 in	 opposition	 to	 an	
exclusively	 private	 model	 of	 care,	 dependence	 and	 vulnerability	 management.	 These	 authors,	
however,	do	not	limit	themselves	to	condemning	the	lack	of	a	state	responsive	to	citizens’	needs,	
or	 ready	 to	 take	on	 the	 vulnerabilities	of	 individuals	 and	 certain	 social	 groups.	Both	Tronto	 and	
Fineman,	 in	 particular,	 are	 aware	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 care	was	 confined	 to	 the	 private	 sphere	 as	 a	
result	of	a	deliberate	choice	made	by	the	state:	on	the	one	hand,	the	state	frames	care	as	a	female	
issue	 that	must	be	managed	primarily	by	 the	 family;	on	 the	other	hand,	especially	 following	 the	
																																								 																				9	A	 risk	 that	Butler	and	other	authors	pointed	out	as	well,	 in	 reference	 to	 some	currents	of	 thinking	on	 the	ethics	of	 care	and	vulnerability	(see	for	example	Butler,	Gambetti	and	Sabsay	(eds),	2016)	
Re	I	Vulnerability,	Care	and	the	Constitutional	State	
	
Revista	de	Estudos	Constitucionais,	Hermenêutica	e	Teoria	do	Direito	(RECHTD),	11(3):314-326	319	
feminist	 revolution	of	 the	1970s	and	 '80s,	 it	 treats	care	as	a	good	that	can	be	purchased	on	the	
market.	
Privatizing	 care,	 however,	 does	 not	 mean	 laissez-faire.	 In	 reality,	 the	 state	 has	 repeatedly	
taken	an	active	role	in	shaping	the	family	and	constructing	gender	roles,	as	well	as	in	orienting	the	
care	market.	Tronto	and	Fineman	do	not	neglect	the	fact	that	the	state	played	a	role	in	this	sense.	
However,	in	my	opinion,	these	authors	fail	to	emphasise	this	fact	sufficiently.10	They	mainly	frame	
it	as	a	problem	of	culture	and	political	choices,	without	linking	this	culture	and	these	choices	to	a	
more	complex	development	of	the	state	on	patriarchal	and	(today)	neo-patriarchal	bases.11		
The	 current	 care	market	 is	 a	 global	market	 in	which	 international	migration	 plays	 a	 central	
role.12	This	does	not	mean	that	in	many	cases	–	such	as	the	Italian	case,	for	example	–	it	 is	not	a	
deregulated	 market.	 In	 fact,	 the	 state	 does	 intervene	 in	 this	 market,	 even	 intensely,	 through	
labour	policies	and,	even	more	so,	migration	policies.	Often,	however,	the	practices	of	institutional	
actors	on	both	of	these	fronts	deliberately	leaves	ample	room	for	“creative”	forms	of	management	
on	the	part	of	social	actors.	 In	many	cases,	 it	 is	precisely	restrictive	regulations	and	bureaucratic	
complicatedness,	together	with	an	insufficient	enforcement	of	the	rules,	that	favour	the	spread	of	
irregular	 and/or	 illegal	 practices.13	 Vulnerability	 and	 care	 are	 not	 neglected.	 The	 state	 is	 not	
disregarding	 them.	Rather,	 it	manages	 them	according	 to	a	 logic	 that	was	once	disciplinary	 (see	
Foucault,	1975)	but	has,	in	the	neoliberal	era,	become	biopolitical	(Foucault,	2004a	and	2004b),	a	
logic	 which	 strengthens	 social	 hierarchies	 and	 provides	 for	 the	 production	 of	 “wasted	 lives”.	
(Bauman,	2004)	The	circuit	of	exclusion	is	thus	managed	through	the	combination	of	increasingly	
scarce	welfare	 services	 -	which	 retain	a	disciplinary	approach	 in	 their	 rhetoric	 and	management	
models,	 but	 in	 reality	 have	 been	 redirected	 towards	 the	 exclusion	 of	 an	 increasingly	 “ethnically	
marked”	population	–	and	institutions	of	the	prison	state	and	penal-migratory	circuit;	these	latter,	
and	at	times	even	explicitly,	are	aimed	at	neutralizing	the	“undeserving	poor”,	mostly	“foreigners”	
or	members	of	“ethnic	minorities”	–	the	“prison	industrial	complex”	in	the	United	States;	(see	Re,	
2006;	Alexander,	2019)	 in	Europe,	a	penal-migratory	circuit	managed	 in	part	by	 the	state	and	 in	
part	 by	 the	 third	 sector,	 in	which	 repressive	 logics,	 charitable	 and	welfare	 logics	 and	 economic	
interests	often	blur.	(See	Avallone,	2019)		
In	this	context,	the	reference	to	vulnerability	–	especially	when	ascribed	to	certain	categories	
of	subjects	–	can	take	on	an	ambivalent	meaning	if	it	is	not	connected,	as	in	Fineman’s	work,	to	an	
“old”	notion	such	as	that	of	equality,	in	particular	in	its	substantive	sense.14		
Vulnerability	and	Equality		
Highlighting	relationships	of	dependence,	the	paradigm	of	vulnerability	and	the	ethics	of	care	
can	enrich	our	understanding	of	 substantive	equality,	but	 it	 cannot	 replace	 it.	 In	The	Vulnerable	
Subject	 and	 the	 Responsive	 State,	 Fineman	 (2010)	 immediately	 makes	 clear	 that	 a	 “more	
responsive”	state	corresponds	to	a	more	equal	society.	On	one	hand	her	critique	targets	equality	
																																								 																				10	 Fineman,	 however,	 extensively	 focused	 on	 the	 role	 of	 the	 family	 as	 an	 institution	 	 both	 in	The	 Autonomy	Myth	 and	 in	 the	previous	The	Neutered	Mother,	the	Sexual	Family,	and	Other	Twentieth	Century	Tragedies,	1995.	11	Regarding	“neo-patriarchy”	see,	for	example,	the	special	issue	of	Soft	Power	(2,	2017)	titled	(Un)domesticated	Feminism,	edited	by	Ida	Dominijanni.	For	an	historical	analysis	using	a	materialist	framework,	in	addition	to	the	famous	Federici,	2004	and	2018,	see	Roberts,	2017.	12	See	for	instance	Yeats,	2009.	13	For	a	discussion	of	the	problem	of	the	privatization	of	care	and	exploitation	of	migrant	women	in	Italy,	see	Sciurba,	2015.	14	Regarding	 the	 ambivalence	of	 the	notion	of	 vulnerability,	 see	Butler,	Gambetti	 and	Sabsay	 (eds),	 2016.	 See	 also	Bernardini,	Casalini,	Giolo	and	Re	(eds),	2018.	
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understood	 in	 a	 merely	 formal	 sense,	 while	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 she	 takes	 issue	 with	 US	 anti-
discrimination	law	according	to	which	“every	gain	by	a	minority	individual	becomes	a	justification	
for	 abandoning	 the	 pursuit	 of	 substantive	 equality”.	 (Fineman,	 2008,	 p.	 20)	 Fineman	 calls	 for	
greater	 involvement	on	 the	part	 of	 the	 state	 in	 policies	 aimed	at	 achieving	 substantive	 equality	
and,	clearly	looking	at	the	European	model,	calls	for	a	change	in	US	political,	legal	and	institutional	
culture	 that	 would	 enable	 legislative	 and	 executive	 powers	 to	 become	 the	 driving	 force	 and	
implementation	centre	of	equality	policies.	In	this	context,	judicial	power	plays	a	supervisory	role.	
It	has	the	task	of	responding	to	the	demands	of	individuals,	putting	an	end	to	what	the	author	calls	
the	 “jurisprudence	of	 identity	 and	discrimination”	 (Fineman,	2008,	p.	 23),	 since	 “the	promise	of	
equality	must	not	be	conditioned	upon	belonging	to	any	identity	category”.	(Fineman,	2008,	p.	23)	
Equality	must	be	understood	as	universal.	The	reference	to	vulnerability	thus	serves,	especially	for	
Fineman,	 to	 justify	 the	 state’s	 commitment	 to	 substantive	 equality.	 The	 need	 to	 respond	 to	
vulnerability	thus	becomes	the	basis	of	equality	policies.	For	Fineman,	the	state’s	commitment	to	
fostering	equality	“is	 rooted	 in	an	understanding	of	vulnerability	and	dependence”.	Additionally,	
the	 precondition	 for	 such	 a	 commitment	 is	 the	 recognition	 that	 “autonomy	 is	 not	 a	 naturally	
occurring	characteristic	of	the	human	condition,	but	a	product	of	social	policy”.	(Fineman,	2008,	p.	
23)	
Similarly,	 according	 to	 Tronto,	 the	 foundation	 of	 democracy	 is	 not	 only	 formal	 but	 also	
substantive	equality.	Democratic	 institutions	have	 the	duty	 to	 achieve	 such	equality	despite	 the	
fact	that	the	market-based	economy	is	constantly	producing	inequalities.	 It	could	be	argued	that	
Tronto's	 position	 is	 similar	 to	 that	 expressed	 by	 Luigi	 Ferrajoli	when	 he	 argues	 that	 “equality	 is	
revealed	 (...)	 as	 the	 legal	 condition	 of	 both	 the	 formal	 and	 substantive	 dimensions	 of	
democracy”.15	 In	 the	 European	 context	 –	 and	 Italy	 in	 particular	 –	 substantive	 equality	 has	 long	
been	the	fundamental	value	underlying	the	constitutional	state,16	which,	as	Geminello	Preterossi	
has	pointed	out,	is	necessarily	also	the	welfare	state	since	the	functioning	of	welfare	ensures	“the	
‘material’	constitutional	framework”.17	The	crisis	of	the	welfare	state	thus	translates	into	a	crisis	of	
democracy.	During	this	crisis,	European	social	sciences	and	law	began	to	look	to	the	US	debate	on	
vulnerability.	The	risk	is	then	that	this	paradigm	will	be	used	not	to	renew	the	constitutional	state	
in	 a	 feminist	 and	 post-identity	 direction,	 but	 rather	 to	 contribute	 to	 its	 erosion.	 This	 risk	 is	
especially	evident	when	vulnerability	 is	referenced	in	order	to	designate	the	“vulnerable	groups”	
deserving	protection,	as	 if	protecting	such	groups	was	a	“moral	duty”	of	the	state.	Such	rhetoric	
expresses	a	paternalistic	and	stigmatising	logic,	which,	moreover,	can	give	rise	to	a	form	of	socially	
constructed	“vulnerability”	 (what	Catriona	Mackenzie,	Wendy	Rogers	and	Susan	Dodds	 (2014,	p.	
1-29)	have	defined	as	“pathogenic	vulnerability”).	Furthermore,	such	a	rhetoric	of	“vulnerability”	
often	aims	to	suppress,	or	overshadow,	references	to	social	rights.	As	Ferrajoli	has	argued,	today	
the	problem	of	democracy	is	precisely	the	ineffectiveness	of	these	rights,	linked	to	the	inadequacy	
of	the	guarantees	provided	for	their	implementation.	Equality	is	the	basis	of	social	cohesion.	It	is	
the	disintegration	caused	by	inequalities	that	is	responsible	for	the	“decline	of	the	public	sphere”	
and	the	very	idea	of	“general	interest”.	This	condition	erodes	civic	sense	and	social	solidarity.	
I	would	 tend	 to	agree	with	Ferrajoli	when,	especially	 thinking	of	Europe	and	 Italy,	he	states	
that	 “the	 process	 of	 reconstituting	 national	 constitutional	 democracies	 does	 not	 require	 any	
																																								 																				15	Ferrajoli,	2018,	kindle	edition,	chap.	1,	par.	2.2	(translated	from	Italian).	See	also	Ferrajoli,	2013.	16	See	Ferrajoli,	2002b.	For	an	analysis	of	Art.	3	of	the	Italian	Constitution,	highlighting	that	the	notion	of	equality	is	central	to	the	Italian	legal	system	and,	in	general,	to	the	systems	of	democratic	countries,	see	Mazzarese,	2006.	According	to	the	author,	the	two	paragraphs	of	Art.	3	must	necessarily	be	read	together,	in	light	of	a	complex	and	plural	conception	of	the	notion	of	legal	equality.	17	Preterossi,	2015,	kindle	edition,	chap.	2	(translated	from	Italian).	
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invention,	 simply	 the	 implementation,	 legally	 due,	 of	 the	 normative	 plans	 formulated	 in	
constitutions.	 Therefore,	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 it	 requires	 refounding	 the	 public	 sphere	 through	 the	
reaffirmation	 and	 development	 of	 social	 rights	 guarantees	 and	 their	 associated	 enforcement	
functions	 and	 institutions”.18	 Similarly,	 Ferrajoli	 is	 right	 in	 distinguishing	 between	 the	
“constitutional	 state”,	 based	 precisely	 on	 citizens'	 entitlement	 to	 social	 rights,	 and	 the	
“bureaucratic	welfare	state”,	i.e.	the	welfare	state	that	offers	social	benefits.	The	latter,	far	from	
being	 an	 outdated	 model,	 seems	 to	 come	 back	 into	 style	 whenever	 complex	 bureaucratic	
mediation	is	established	to	limit	universal	welfare	according	to	neoliberal	governance	(think	of	the	
university	 or	 healthcare	 system).19	 As	 Fabio	 Ciaramelli	 (2013,	 p.	 256)	 has	 noted,	 constitutional	
democracies	are	characterised	by	having	overcome	the	 formalism	of	 legal	 rationality	and	having	
tied	the	law	to	the	creation	of	concrete	content.	According	to	Ferrajoli,	the	welfare	state	is	based	
on	“a	network	of	obligations	imposed	to	guarantee	social	rights”.20	Referencing	his	theory	of	the	
constitutional	state		–	and	the	political	project	driving	it	–	does	not	entail,	however,	ignoring	either	
the	role	of	interpretation	or	that	of	politics.	As	Ferrajoli	himself	acknowledges,	the	role	of	politics	
is	 not	 only	 relevant,	 it	 also	 has	 to	 do	 with	 the	 very	 construction	 of	 democracy	 as	 well	 as	 the	
“constant	refounding	(...)	of	the	constitutional	agreement	through	the	representation	of	the	social	
struggles	and	demands	 for	 reform	expressed	by	society”.21	As	 far	as	 the	role	of	 interpretation	 is	
concerned,	 	while	adhering	 to	a	 legal	positivist	point	of	view,	Ferrajoli	once	again	acknowledges	
that	 interpretation	 is	 an	 inescapable	 step.	 The	 norms	 formulated	 in	 constitutions	 are,	 in	 fact,	
necessarily	 implemented	 through	 interpretative	 processes	 –	 first	 and	 foremost,	 through	 the	
judicial	review	by	the	constitutional	court	–	and	over	the	years	such	 interpretation	has	gradually	
led	 this	 legislation	 to	 be	 adjusted	 to	 face	 to	 new	 challenges.22	 Further,	 it	 is	 precisely	 on	 the	
interpretative	 level	 that	 theories	 of	 vulnerability	 and	 care	 appear	 to	 pose	 the	 most	 significant	
challenge.	 As	 scholars	 have	 noted,	 in	 fact,	 both	 national	 and	 European	 jurisprudence	 make	
reference	 to	 vulnerability.23	 In	 some	 cases,	 it	 appears	 functional	 to	 augmenting	 the	 proactive	
obligations	of	states	in	the	protection	of	human	rights	and	to	strengthening	substantive	equality;24	
in	 other	 cases,	 instead,	 it	 appears	 to	 undermine	 guarantees,	 operating	 as	 a	 restrictive	 standard	
(rights	are	protected	only	if	the	subject	claiming	them	is	shown	to	be	in	a	condition	of	particular	
vulnerability).	The	bottom-up	construction	of	an	emancipatory	notion	of	vulnerability25	might	thus	
help	us	in	refining	the	interpretation	of	the	principle	of	equality.	
																																								 																				18	Ferrajoli,	2018,	kindle	edition,	chap.	3,	par.	5	(translated	from	Italian).		19	 Regarding	 healthcare,	 see	 in	 Italy	 Geddes,	 2018.	 Regarding	 the	 university,	 see,	 for	 example,	 Berg	 and	 Seeber,	 2016.	 The	pamphlet	 published	 by	 Rosso,	 2018,	 is	 also	 interesting	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 transformations	 that	 the	 Italian	 university	 have	undergone.	20	Ferrajoli,	2007,	p.	43	(translated	from	Italian).	Regarding	social	rights	as	fundamental	rights,	see	also	Ferrajoli,	2002a.	21	Ferrajoli,	2012,	p.	120	(translated	from	Italian).	22	In	his	critical	analysis	of	Principia	iuris	(2007),	a	work	in	which	Ferrajoli	engaged	in	the	construction	of	an	axiomatized	theory	of	constitutional	law,	Riccardo	Guastini	noted	the	impossibility	of	distinguishing	the	"law"	from	the	concepts	and	doctrines	that	jurists	 employ,	 see	Guastini,	 2008.	 For	 a	discussion	of	Principia	 iuris,	 please	 see	Mazzarese,	 2008a	 and	Catania,	 2009.	Others,	including	Costa,	2009,	Preterossi,	2009	and	Baccelli,	2012	authoritatively	recognized	the	possibility	of	drawing,	in	some	respects,	on	Ferrajoli's	theory,	despite	having	very	different	orientations	and	criticizing	some	basic	lines	of	his	theoretical	construct.	The	essays	by	Catania,	Costa	and	Preterossi	were	later	collected	in	Baccelli	(ed),	2012.	The	volume	also	contains	an	essay	by	Giuseppe	Palmisano	and	Ferrajoli's	reply	to	the	critical	remarks	directed	at	his	work.	23	See	Ruet,	2015,	Burguorgue-Larsen	(éd.),	2014	and	Timmer,	2013,	in	particular	regarding	the	case-law	of	European	courts.	24	 Elena	 Pariotti	 underlined	 this	 aspect	 in	 her	 report	 on	 "Vulnerability	 and	 subject	 of	 human	 rights"	 presented	 during	 the	Conference	"The	semantics	of	vulnerability"	(University	of	Ferrara,	15	September	2017).	See	also	Pariotti,	2018.	25	Gianfrancesco	Zanetti	used	this	term	in	his	introductory	presentation	of	the	"Day	of	Dialogue	on	denied	rights.	Protected	rights.	Children's	rights,	 trajectories	of	analysis	and	good	Practices",	at	 the	University	of	Modena	and	Reggio	Emilia,	Modena,	October	6th	2016.	See	also	Zanetti,	2019.	
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In	other	words,	thinking	on	vulnerability	and	care	may	be	significant,	in	the	direction	authors	
such	 as	 Fineman,	 Tronto	 and	 Kittay	 suggest,	 if	 it	 serves	 to	 strengthen	 the	 “political	 and	 legal	
project”	of	 substantive	equality,	operating,	as	Fineman	writes,	as	a	 “heuristic	 tool”	 for	unveiling	
forms	 of	 inequality	 long	 removed	 from	 the	 public	 (and	 doctrinal	 and	 jurisprudential)	 debate,	
beginning	with	 inequalities	 stemming	 from	 the	 unfair	 distribution	 of	 care.	 In	 the	 contemporary	
world,	 such	 inequalities	are	mainly	associated	with	gender,	but	other	 factors	 such	as	 citizenship	
and	class	also	participate.	They	cannot	be	tackled	without	granting	care	work	a	social	value.	This	
shift	is	by	no	means	certain,	as	it	implies	questioning,	on	a	political,	social	and	legal	level,	the	main	
cornerstone	of	the	patriarchal	system.		
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 model	 of	 the	 “welfare	 state”,	 which	 is	 at	 the	 same	 time	 a	
“constitutional	 state”	 gives	 us	 the	 instrument	 to	 curb	 the	 risk	 of	 paternalistic/maternalistic	 and	
illiberal	 tendencies	 that	 some	 interpretations	 of	 the	 paradigm	 of	 vulnerability	 (and	 care)	might	
lead	us	towards.	As	Ferrajoli	has	pointed	out,	in	fact,	within	the	model	of	the	constitutional	state	
both	formal	and	substantive	equality	 is	 to	be	understood	as	an	equality	of	rights.	 (On	this	 issue,	
see	also	Mazzarese,	2006)	Equality	 is	not	octroyée.	 It	 is	won,	 though	never	definitively,	 through	
struggles	 for	 rights	 and	must	 therefore	be	 combined	with	 autonomy.	 Freedom	 rights	 and	 social	
rights	are	actually	linked	under	the	banner	of	equality,	and	they	are	also	connected	to	the	right	to	
acknowledge	 “difference”	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 a	 pluralist	 state.26	 Feminist	 thinking	 on	
vulnerability	can	 take	a	position	on	 this	point	as	well	 that	 is	 synergistic	 rather	 than	oppositional	
when	it	reminds	us	that	autonomy	should	not	be	understood	as	a	fortress	in	which	the	individual	
is	 imprisoned,	an	“inner	citadel”.	 (See	Christman,	1999)	Rather,	 it	 should	be	seen	as	a	 relational	
concept,	 “in	 the	 twin	 senses	 that	 its	 development	 and	 exercise	 requires	 extensive	 social	
scaffolding	and	support	and	that	its	development	and	exercise	can	be	thwarted	by	exploitative	or	
oppressive	 interpersonal	 relationships	 and	 by	 repressive	 or	 unjust	 social	 and	 political	
institutions”.27	 From	 this	 perspective,	 while	 on	 one	 hand	 being	 autonomous	 means	 exposing	
oneself	 to	 social	 relations	 –	 and	 therefore	 being	 vulnerable	 –	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 protecting	
oneself	 from	 vulnerability	 means	 promoting	 autonomy	 to	 the	 greatest	 possible	 extent.	
(Mackenzie,	2014)28	Not	to	mention	that,	as	Butler	pointed	out,	in	some	cases	the	claim/exposure	
of	 vulnerability	 in	 and	 of	 itself	 can	 be	 an	 act	 of	 political	 agency,	 a	 strategy	 of	 resistance.	 (See	
Butler,	2016,	p.	12-27	and	2017)		
Conclusions		
The	 vulnerability	 and	 care	 perspectives	 can	 therefore	 help	 us	 to	 redesign	 social	 policies,	
involving	the	relevant	actors	(and,	first	of	all,	those	who	receive	and	give	care)	 in	their	design	to	
ensure	 the	 efficacy	 of	 fundamental	 rights.	 They	 also	 point	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 building	 a	
gendered	 democracy29	 and	 the	 need	 to	 address	 the	 challenges	 arising	 from	 new	 forms	 of	
precariousness.	 Finally,	 they	 can	guide	 the	 interpretation	of	 laws	 (and	 rights).	 I	 am	 thinking,	 for	
example,	of	the	issue	of	gender-based	violence,	an	issue	in	which	recognizing	that	vulnerability	is	a	
constant	element	of	intimate	relationships	could	help	in	both	establishing	prevention	policies	that	
																																								 																				26	Regarding	this	topic,	in	addition	to	Ferrajoli,	2018,	see	also	Mazzarese,	2008b	and	2013.	27	Mackenzie,	Rogers	and	Dodds,	2014,	p.	17.	Regarding	the	notion	of	“relational	autonomy”,	see	also	Mackenzie	and	Stoljar	(eds),	2000.	28	For	Mackenzie,	who	draws	on	 the	capability	approach	by	Sen	and	Nussbaum,	autonomy	 is	both	 "the	capacity	 to	 lead	a	 self-determining	life"	and	"the	status	of	being	recognized	as	an	autonomous	agent	by	others"	(ibid.,	p.	41).	See	also	Anderson,	2014.	29	 I	will	not	discuss	here	 the	different	perspectives	 from	which	 the	 issue	has	been	addressed,	 I	 simply	refer,	 in	addition	 to	 the	aforementioned	book	by	Joan	Tronto,	Caring	Democracy,	to	Casadei,	2017.	
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deconstruct	 the	 rigid	 boundaries	 between	 gender	 identities,	 and	 in	 designing	 models	 of	
intervention	aimed	at	the	specific	contexts	of	violence.	In	relation	to	gender	violence,	for	example,	
taking	 vulnerability	 into	 account	 entails	 giving	 space	 and	 value	 to	 victims,	 building	 adequate	
networks	 for	 listening,	 providing	 protection	 and	 economic	 support,30	 offering	 abusive	 men	 the	
opportunity	 to	 change	 their	 behaviour,31	 and	 recognising	 and	 adequately	 supporting	 children	
victims	of	domestic	violence	and	orphans	of	femicide	in	the	knowledge	that	the	traumas	they	have	
suffered	may	emerge	even	many	years	later.	That	is,	it	entails	enacting	a	series	of	strategies	that	
go	beyond	the	rigid	logic	of	the	trial	that	often	turns	victims	into	defendants,	leaving	them	without	
protection.	
There	 are	 various	 strategies	 states	might	 adopt,	 involving	 as	much	 as	 possible	 the	 relevant	
non-institutional	 actors	 (feminist	 groups,	 anti-violence	 centres,	 etc.),	 combating	 stigmatization,	
and	adopting	wide-ranging	prevention	policies	as	well	as	targeted	protection	and	empowerment	
policies.	Such	measures	would	be	fertile	grounds	for	the	emergence	of	the	figure	Fineman	calls	the	
“responsive	 state”;	 quite	 unlike	 the	 current	 state	 in	 Italy	 that	 was	 recently	 condemned	 by	 the	
European	Court	of	Human	Rights	precisely	for	 its	 inability	to	protect	the	victims	of	gender-based	
violence.	(European	Court	of	Human	Rights,	Talpis	c.	Italia,	March	2nd	2017)		
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